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ABSTRACT
With more people on the move than ever before – an estimated 1 billion – it is crucial to understand 
who these people are, why they are moving and where they are going. In this article, Catherine 
Wihtol de Wenden does just that by offering a panorama of contemporary migration patterns. 
The author sets out how migration became a globalised and – paradoxically - a regionalised 
phenomena, examining, for example, the flux of migrants from Latin America to North America 
and the migratory system that focusses on Russia. She then addresses several “new migratory 
situations” including the Chinese arriving in Africa and wealthy retirees from the Global North 
finding homes in the Global South. Refugees and undocumented migrants are given special focus 
given the author’s belief that these categories of migrants are likely to increase or become more 
diversified in the near future. The article concludes by addressing three aspects which will continue 
to shape “new migrations”: the increase in the world population and international migration; the 
relationship between urbanisation and migration; and finally, climate change.
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•   Why are more people on the move than ever before   •
and where they are going?
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At the beginning of the 21st century, international migration reached unprecedented levels. 
Unlike the past, however, it is not the Europeans who are migrating around the world. On 
the contrary, with its population in decline, Europe has become one of the top destinations 
for migrants. But, in fact, the entire planet is on the move, especially the Global South. New 
destinations have emerged, such as the Gulf States, the African continent and some Asian 
countries, whereas former countries of origin have now become host or transit countries, such as 
those in southern Europe, and more recently, Mexico, Turkey and Northwest Africa (Maghreb). 
Over the past thirty years, migration has globalised. Since the mid-1970s, the number of 
migrants has tripled: there were 77 million in 1975, 120 million in 1999, 150 million in 
the early 2000s and 244 million today.1 The tendency is for this process to continue, as 
the factors contributing to this mobility are unlikely to disappear. These factors include: 
differences in the levels of human development (which include life expectancy, level of 
education and level of well-being) along the main fault lines in the world; political and 
environmental crises that “produce” refugees and displaced persons; reduced transportation 
costs; the increased number of passports being issued, even in countries from which it 
used to be difficult leave; lack of hope in poor and poorly governed countries; the role of 
the media; greater awareness of the fact that it is possible to alter the course of one’s life 
by migrating abroad; and, finally, climate change. 
In terms of migration flows, the European Union continues to be the most sought after 
destination in the world, ahead of other major poles of migration, such as: the United States 
of America (U.S.) (in second place), the Gulf countries (third) and Russia (fourth). While the 
South-North flows are a predominant issue in debates on migration, the flows towards the South 
of the planet (close to 120 million, including the South-South and North-to-South flows) have 
now matched the number of those moving to the North (close to 120 million: South-North 
and North-North). Together, they add up to a total of 244 million international migrants – 
equivalent to 3.5% of the world population. To this, one must add close to 740 million internal 
migrants who are migrating within their own countries. Therefore, there are 1 billion migrants 
in the world; in relation to the global population, this means one in every seven people. 
The redistribution of migration in the world can be explained by the new trends in 
migration: women account for 51% of international migrants. There are close to 40 
million environmentally displaced persons. Refugee flows are estimated at 60 million. 
That is not to mention the unaccompanied minors, retirees moving to milder climates 
and North-North migration related to the economic crisis.2
1 • The globalisation and regionalisation of flows
This gradual mutation took place over a period of 20 years - a period marked by the 
globalisation of migration flows. The same causes - urbanisation and metropolisation, 
population pressure, unemployment, information and the transnationalisation of migration 
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networks - generated the same effects all over the world, namely the increase in the mobility 
of populations that had previously been sedentary. That said, due to the lack of means to 
leave, the poorest still remain where they are. Some places were particularly affected by the 
new flows such as the islands of the Mediterranean Sea and the Caribbean, as well as certain 
border areas - such as Thrace, between Greece and Turkey - as they differentiate the world 
of free circulation from the one whose borders are closed to the majority of migrants. New 
countries are attracting migrants, such as the emerging economies, or the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa). At the same time, a tremendous amount of internal 
migration is also underway. There are as many Chinese migrants within China as there are 
international migrants at the global level: close to 240 million.
Internal and international migration affects nearly all regions of the world. While the lines 
between categories of migrants and countries became increasingly blurred as they globalised, 
the globalisation of migration has – paradoxically – been accompanied by the regionalisation 
of migratory flows. At the global level, migration is organised geographically into complex 
systems of migration that revolve around the same region, in which complementarities are 
built between the zones of departure and arrival. These complementarities are related to 
geographical proximity; historical, linguistic and cultural ties; transnational networks built 
by migrants; and when “pull” and “push” factors related to labour come together to form 
a formal or informal space for circulation, which may or may not be accompanied by an 
institutional facilitation of travel. There are various informal and formal ways to regroup 
migrants, for example: “migratory pairs” in which migrants who are essentially from the same 
country all go to another country, as in the case of Algeria and France; “diaspora migration”, 
when one group builds links with several host countries, such as Italian, Moroccan and 
Turkish migrants; or when the migration flow of people from one country is spread globally 
over numerous countries, as is the case of migrants from India (close to 30 million in the 
world) and China (close to 50 million). Even so, regionalisation still dominates the logic of 
the migration flows. This is why in any given region of the world, there are more migrants 
coming from the same region than from other regions of the world.3
This holds true for the Americas. The bulk of migration flows towards the U.S. (close 
to 43 million people born abroad) comes from Latin America and the Caribbean. In 
South America, host countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela) receive migrants 
mainly from neighbouring countries, especially from the Andean region and Central 
America (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras and Peru). In “Brasiguay”, 
Brazilians go to develop land in Paraguay, while Paraguayan peasants go to work in Brazil. 
Historically, this was not the case - several decades ago the migratory contingent was 
essentially made up of Europeans on their way to the U.S., Canada, Argentina and Brazil. 
The same scenario exists in Europe: with some 30 million foreigners, Europe maintains 
migratory synergy with the southern coast of the Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa 
up to the Equator. South Africa absorbs the bulk of flows from southern Africa. Previously, 
the Europeans were in these regions for exploration, colonisation, missionary and trade 
purposes (the 3 “Ms” in Africa: military, missionaries and merchants). 
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The Russian world constitutes another migration system; there are approximately 13 million 
foreigners currently in Russia. The centrifugal and centripetal movements that have intensified 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 are reshaping the former USSR: Russia’s ageing 
population and demand for labour attracts people from the independent Muslim republics 
that maintain strong cultural ties with Russia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and 
Azerbaijan) and from neighbouring China along its eastern border. Sovietism, the Russian 
language and the elimination of visas between the Commonwealth of Independent States4 
and the Russian Federation have led to the constitution of a privileged network of migration.5
Southeast Asia – which, together with India and China, has the largest supply of migrants 
in the world – is part of another migration system. Rich and/or ageing countries such as 
Japan and South Korea, but also Taiwan and Singapore, attract migrants from China. The 
Philippines, where one out of every ten inhabitants lives abroad, constitutes an abundant 
source of labour for both the region and abroad, namely the Gulf States, Europe and the 
U.S. Depending on the situation at the time, Malaysia and Thailand can be either host 
countries or countries of departure in the region. Australia and New Zealand, which had 
previously been largely populated by Europeans, are now fed by migration from Southeast 
Asia. Migration from India and Pakistan also “irrigates” the region, but continues, at the 
same time, to be as globalised as migration from China. Rich and sparsely populated, the 
Gulf countries attract their share of South-South migration from the southern coast of the 
Mediterranean (Egypt, the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa), Pakistan and the Philippines. 
2 • New migratory situations 
The regionalisation of migration flows combines with new transversal intercontinental migration 
flows. The most recent flow to emerge is that of Chinese migrants moving to Africa. Rich in 
raw materials (oil, minerals, fish and wood) and in need of infrastructure (telephone, Internet, 
buildings and public works), the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa are now hosting Chinese 
businessmen and temporary workers who fill up on marine and underground resources. 
North-to-South migration flows, for their part, are also generating new trends in migration. 
“Britishland”, where the British go to retire in Western France (Normandy, Bretagne and 
Aquitaine), is one example of this. Relatively well-off retirees are also migrating to Spain (the 
Germans and the British), southern Portugal (the British), Greece, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Senegal (the French). The same phenomenon can be found in the Caribbean, this time with 
retirees from the U.S. and Canada. Bulgaria has been seeking to play this role since it joined 
the European Union in 2004. These migration trends are an extension of international 
tourism, where comparative advantages such as the cost of living, the quality of services and 
the climate work in favour of sunny countries. Another type of intercontinental migration 
flows - of unaccompanied minors or youth in search of work or asylum - complete this 
increasingly fragmented portrait: Afghans seeking to enter the United Kingdom, prostitutes 
from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, who take great risk to do so. 
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Two large categories of migrants deserve special mention, which are likely to increase or 
become more diversified: refugees and undocumented migrants. The term “refugee” was 
defined by the Geneva Convention in 1951, which was drafted in the context of the Cold 
War and with the tendency to protect dissidents from the Soviet Union and the entire 
Communist bloc in particular. Initially limited to Europe, this category has gradually 
been extended to the rest of the world since 1967 and the volume of refugees increased 
significantly throughout the 1980-2016 period due to the major crises shaking the world: 
civil wars in Latin America, conflicts in the Middle East, ex-Yugoslavia, Algeria, the African 
Great Lakes region, the Ivory Coast, Kurdish regions, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, 
Darfur, Myanmar, Eritrea and Somalia, and now Syria... 
The majority of these conflicts led to people being displaced to neighbouring regions, 
protected by non-governmental organisations: they are known as “internally displaced 
persons”. Other conflicts produced asylum seekers who sought recognition for their status 
as refugees. Host countries, which used to grant this status generously in the past, have 
shown themselves to be much more hesitant due to restrictions on migration policies in 
general and the fact that the profiles of refugees have changed considerably in relation to 
the Geneva Convention: applicants are collective, not individual, and threatened not by 
their states, but by civil society (in the case of Islamic terrorism, for example), or flee their 
countries for more social than political reasons (gender, in the case of women, or sexual 
orientation, social class, ethnicity and religion). Therefore, at times, the recognition of 
the right to asylum has evolved based on a dual tendency – humanitarian and security – 
which has resulted in declining rates of recognition.
 
Could the environmentally displaced be considered refugees, given that they are also 
constitute a type of forced migration? Although the phenomenon is not new, it has only 
recently become a political issue related to global warming. Until now, coverage under 
the right to asylum has been basically inexistent. A specific status for the environmentally 
displaced would need to be created within the United Nations (U.N.) framework – not 
one that simply extends the coverage of the Geneva Convention to them, but rather one 
that puts them under the protection of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. There 
are multiple causes of environmental displacement: in addition to desertification linked to 
climate change, natural disasters (cyclones, tornados, earthquakes and volcano eruptions), 
deforestation, the melting of glaciers, the submersion of flood zones (Maldives and Tuvalu 
islands, the Halligen Islands in Germany, Bangladesh), invasions of insects and mudslides 
can all cause displacement. The majority of the focal points of environmental crises are 
located in the South, in poor countries whose states rarely have the means to address them. 
According to climate experts (of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), the 
number of displaced persons could reach between 50 and 150 million by 2050, and even 
be as high as 200 million by the end of the 21st century.
Another group of displaced persons is that of stateless individuals who have either lost their 
nationality or never had one due to state succession, the redefining of borders or processes 
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to rebuild states that exclude certain minorities. Many of them can be found in Bangladesh 
and Myanmar. Their status is defined by the 1954 Statelessness Convention, but states seek 
to reduce the number of stateless persons by offering them access to nationality.
Migrants in an irregular situation are part of a global, though disperse, category. They include 
those who have entered a country illegally without the required documents (passports and 
visas), have entered legally, but prolonged their stay beyond the legal limits or have accessed the 
labour market without due authorisation to work (namely students or family members). Their 
number - which, by definition, is uncertain - is estimated to be between 11 and 12 million in 
the U.S. and 5 million in Europe. They are also present in Russia and countries of the South 
(the Maghreb, Turkey and Mexico), as these countries went quickly from being countries of 
departure to host countries without having immigration policies in place. This was the case 
thirty years ago in southern Europe, which conducted mass regularisations of “batches” of 
immigrants in irregular situations from 1985 to 2000 (Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal).
At times, these people form “neither...nor...” contingents: neither able to regularise their 
situation given the legal criteria used (stable employment, family ties), nor can they be 
expelled, as they come from countries at war. They work in the informal market in sectors 
often neglected by native workers (the 3 “Ds” - difficult, dirty and dangerous): restaurants, 
construction, public works, factory work, cleaning, domestic services and providing care for 
the elderly. Though generally deprived of their rights, they can sometimes exercise some of 
them, such as access to education for their children and emergency medical care.
Their mobilisation in host countries has often led to an awareness of the need to shift 
migration policies from a strict policy to one with more flexibility, since they are often 
a valve which can be adjusted to reflect the realities of the labour market. They are also 
contributing to the emergence of the right to mobility as a human right of the 21st century 
and to a reflection on the global governance of migration as a whole: a multilateral 
management structure is needed that brings countries of departure, host countries, migrant 
associations, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, trade unions, 
churches and employers together to ensure that migration is beneficial to host countries, 
countries of departure and to migrants themselves, thus becoming a global public good. If 
the world were to stop moving, the gaps between the rich and the poor and between youth 
and seniors would become even greater. The U.N. has been supporting this process by 
holding annual global forums on migration and development since 2006.6
Since the early 21st century, the migration of elites has drawn special attention from host 
countries and countries of origin. The latter began to take interest in their emigrants, 
especially the most highly skilled and trained. Conscious of the risks of competition 
in the recruitment of brains for their leading sectors from all over the world, host 
countries opened their borders to skilled migration: point-based systems were adopted 
in Canada, Australia and Germany in 2005; “selective” immigration in France, since 
2006, and bilateral agreements have been signed between neighbouring countries or 
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countries of the South. The countries that attract the highest number of elite and 
students are the U.S., Canada and Western Europe. Those watching their brains leave 
are Eastern European countries, Russia after the fall of Communism in 1991 and, in 
particular, countries of the South (Sub-Saharan Africa, the Maghreb, the Middle East, 
India and China). Are we seeing a brain drain (brains fleeing the country) or brain gain 
(a diaspora of knowledge that contributes to development through exile)? It all depends 
on the situation. The departure of a highly skilled worker from countries like India or 
China with over a billion inhabitants does not have the same impact as the departure of 
a doctor from a sparsely populated African country. Studies reveal that contrary to the 
longstanding belief that migration represents a loss for the country of origin, migration 
contributes to development due to both remittances and also its potential repercussions 
on the labour market of certain countries (Indian information technology specialists 
providing work in India; Chinese investors in China, for example). The more migration 
there is, the more human development there will be. 
Conversely, development often induces migration, as was the case of rural exodus in 19th 
century Europe – a phenomenon that can be observed today in many countries of the 
South, especially in Africa. The monetisation of the economy, advances in information and 
education, the abandonment of fatalism, the hope of fulfilling one’s lifelong dreams, the 
individualisation of migration routes and the availability of travel shifted internal migration 
to international migration. Sometimes, a gap emerges between the populations that do 
better, for whom migration is a source of well-being, and their countries of origin, which 
do not offer any opportunities for improvement in the short run. Restoring migrants’ 
confidence in countries of the South appears to be a necessary condition for their return 
and for productive investments that go beyond the family environment. 
Finally, there are the transmigrants, who complete this panorama of new migratory 
situations. Appearing in the 1990s-2000s at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, they 
formed the bulk of East-West migration in Europe. Anticipating their entry into the 
European Union, they began to develop various forms of circular migration, as they 
adopted mobility as a way of life. Initially they were travelling sales people from the 
East to the West, then seasonal or domestic workers in Eastern Europe on their way 
to Southern Europe, fake tourists seeking work or merchants selling wares occasionally 
in the markets. Eventually they began to constitute a new category at the turn of the 
21st century, before their gradual access to the formal European labour market made 
them less visible. They carry out their lives “here” and “there”, as one out of every two 
transmigrants live from the force of transnational migration ties. This kind of circular 
migration exists in other regions close to fault lines in the world, but there, the legal 
conditions are less favourable, as migrants are required to have visas. Those who have a 
privileged status (dual nationality, multiple entry visas, merchants and businesspersons, 
intellectuals) constitute networks for migrating back and forth between the two shores 
of the Mediterranean, which are buzzing with entrepreneurial and commercial activities. 
The more open borders are, the more migrants circulate and the less they settle definitively 
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in one place, as it broadens their living space. Conversely, the more borders are closed, 
the more irregular migrants tend to settle in one place, as they fear that if they return to 
their countries of origin, they will not be able to return to their country of destination. 
Circular migration is one of the main trends underlying new mobility today.
3 • Perspectives
Borders determine the nature of flows – regular or irregular, skilled or unskilled, internal 
or external – and emigration and immigration policies. For flows originating in the South, 
in countries of South-to-North emigration, borders define the conditions for nationals 
leaving the country (exit visas, now in disuse; travel documents in order) and conditions 
for entry (repatriation, promotion of return). In countries of immigration, borders 
establish the conditions for entry (whether a visa is required or not, selection of immigrants 
through a system of points or quotas), stay (access to the labour market and social and 
political rights, requirements for obtaining nationality) and departure (deportation and 
return policies). These rules also apply to South-South migration, though less rigidly, 
as many countries lack migration policies and seek, at the same time, to protect their 
nationals abroad (assistance and protection for emigrants, regulation of money transfers 
and facilitating emigrants’ right to vote in elections in their country). Some regional 
systems allowing for the free movement of persons guarantee nationals the freedom to 
circulate in their respective member-states, to work and to settle, and access to social and 
political rights. Access to these rights may also be extended to immigrants established 
there on a long-term basis. The regime for migration flows originating in the North is 
completely different, as migrants from these countries are free to come and go in countries 
of emigration (free exit) and immigration (free entry). As for flows of migrants between 
countries of the North, access to fundamental rights is guaranteed, even though migrants 
must meet certain conditions in order to obtain nationality. In regards to North-to-South 
flows, while host countries of the South welcome permanency, migrants are rarely given 
equal access to the same rights as nationals: naturalisation is difficult, if not impossible; 
there is an absence of political rights for foreigners and access to property is sometimes 
restricted. One third of the population of the planet, in the North, benefits from the right 
to migrate to the North and to the South, whereas other two thirds cannot move freely 
from the South to the North and are also deprived of rights and guarantees when moving 
from the South to the South. Borders also influence the profile of migrants, as the elite, 
migrants in an irregular situation and East-West migration are the result of either open or 
closed borders. Borders also accentuate the lag between migration flows and policies, and 
hinder the formation of regional migration spaces that respond to their own rationale. In 
light of global inequalities, migration will continue, but with new configurations. 
To conclude this article, three aspects of this issue are worth highlighting: the increase 
in the world population and international migration; the relationship between 
urbanisation and migration; and finally, climate change.
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Population and international migration
In a world with 9 billion inhabitants by 2040, Asia will be home to more than half of 
the global population (57%). India, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, the U.S., Brazil 
and Mexico will be the most densely populated countries on the planet. In the North, the 
European continent will have to address the accelerated ageing of its population, especially 
in countries in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe. In the Global South, in countries of 
departure, which will be affected differently by the demographic transition, ties will remain 
between the transition and international migration.
The demographic transition may bring transformation to the economy of migration. This 
transformation will consist mainly of a shift from the altruistic and collective approach to 
migration of migrants of the past (whose goal was to feed their family and improve their 
living conditions) to an individualist approach (carry out their life plan). New migrants 
are confronted with new urban, consumerist values linked to the increase in the level of 
education and a way of life geared towards mobility thanks to their transnational ties.
Therefore, characterised by the greater availability of young adults with fewer children than 
their elders, migration is the flip side of another possible outcome: revolt (exit or voice, 
according to the Hirschman model).7 The tendency of young migrants to give priority 
to their individual projects and to turn to the diaspora to accumulate human capital and 
diversify their remittances is accentuated by host countries’ decisions to choose highly 
skilled migrants over labourers in order to reunite families. The new profiles of international 
migration are thus linked to demographic transitions.8
Urbanisation and migration
Among the factors that will influence the evolution of migration flows, the rapid 
urbanisation of the planet is high on the list. The number of megalopolises with more 
than ten million inhabitants, which was 16 in 2009, is expected to increase to 29 by 
2025. These megalopolises will be home to 10.3% of the world’s entire urban population. 
Three quarters of the cities that will exceed the 10 million inhabitant mark by 2025 are 
located in developing countries. Three of the ten largest cities in 2030 will be in India 
and five of the 25 biggest cities will be in China. According to U.N. estimates, cities that 
will have more than 20 million inhabitants by 2030 include: Tokyo, Delhi, Bombay, 
São Paulo, Dhaka, Mexico City, New York, Calcutta, Shanghai and Karachi. These cities 
constitute places where not only economic activities are concentrated, but also migrants 
who are part of the rural exodus and migrants in transit. They are where information is 
exchanged on travel networks and where prospective migrants find job niches that enable 
them to survive before their great journey. While the rural exodus affects the poorest, few 
of them cross borders; many, such as the environmentally displaced and internal refugees, 
remain limited to internal migration. But urban life is full of exchanges of information, 
travel opportunities and places where people compare national wages with those earned 
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abroad, as well as ways of life. Many internal migrants make their plans after passing 
through the city, which is sometimes turned into a metropolis.  
Cities in Africa will grow the most, followed by cities in Asia, according to U.N. 
predictions.9 In 2030, more than 80% of the world’s urban population will live in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. Countries with the largest urban populations will continue 
to have sizeable rural populations: in China and India, which together have 1.5 billion 
urban dwellers, more than one billion people will still be living in rural areas.
Women currently account for 50% of international migrants. Millions of women leave 
their country of origin every year. They tend to be more numerous than men in rich 
countries affected by the ageing of their populations, which require caregivers and nurses. 
The consequences of female migration are, in addition to the care drain (the exodus of 
health care professionals), the risk of family breakdown in countries of origin and their 
dependency on new flows – a kind of chain migration.
Climate change
The interest in migration due to climate change is recent. It is still difficult to determine 
who are the people migrating for environmental reasons. It is perhaps necessary to 
distinguish between climate and environmental migrants, as the impacts of climate change 
on migration are uncertain. In fact, according to specialists, while climate conditions 
do influence migration, their influence is limited in relation to other socioeconomic or 
political factors (in the case of refugees), as there is often more than one cause for migration. 
The migration they generate is more temporary than permanent, as people are displaced 
within the country and located in the South. As for the dynamics of environmental 
migration observed throughout the world, the volume of international migrants linked 
to the environment is still small. Among the affected regions, the Mediterranean basin – 
the most densely populated arid region in the world – is highly exposed to the impacts 
of drought, especially in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and Morocco. Migration as an individual 
adaptation strategy will be confronted by the political and societal choices adopted by 
states. The poorest households will be affected the most and, to a lesser extent, those 
who benefit from remittances and who have the choice of moving somewhere else. In the 
Southern hemisphere, cyclones can make temporary migration permanent, when income 
is lost. In Bangladesh, Vietnam, China and Mozambique, the population, which is already 
more accustomed to environmental shocks, is moving due to the risks of flooding. They 
are more mobile there than in the Maghreb, where the population continues to be more 
sedentary. However, the poorest do not want to move or do not have the means to: for 
them, migration is the last resort, as they are aware of the absence of effective government 
action and the failure of collective solutions to reduce their vulnerability.
Sometimes, climate change can affect people’s mobility indirectly – for example, when it causes 
a food crisis and reducing dependency on agriculture can reduce the effects of the crisis, as 
26
THE SUR FILE ON MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTSCATHERINE WIHTOL DE WENDEN
• SUR 23 - v.13 n.23 • 17 - 28 | 2016
can the generalised trend of urbanisation. What needs to be planned, then: local development 
or the development of mobility? While international organisations are unanimous on the 
need to prevent forced migration, the fact the Geneva Convention on Refugees does not take 
climate change into account leads us to other policies on the international scene, such as land-
use planning, the regional approach and the issue of climate justice.
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